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1The Swinging Pendulum of Sentencing Reform: 
Political Actors Regulating District Court Discretion 
Lydia Brashear Tiede
ABSTRACT
In this article, application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and 
changes to the law, limiting and expanding judicial discretion under the 
Guidelines are analyzed from 1999 to 2006 for a sample of drug 
trafficking cases. Despite a large number of studies on the impact of the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and their reform, this is the only recent study 
that specifically controls for case fact variation so that the effect of the 
law and reforms can be properly tested. Most previous studies of the 
Guidelines to date do not adequately consider how the facts of the cases 
may drive the decisions that judges are making. This study substantially 
advances our understanding of the Guidelines by analyzing cases with 
similar case facts. The method employed allows for a specific analysis of 
how the Guideline system both allows for and prevents political actors 
from controlling disparity in sentencing. The results show that when 
district court judges use sentencing tables required by the Sentencing 
Guidelines they overwhelmingly focus their decisions at the very 
minimum of those ranges, suggesting judicial preferences that are at 
odds with those of Congress. Further, disparity in sentencing persists 
among the circuits despite laws that constrain judicial discretion, such 
as the PROTECT Act of 2003, and laws or cases that broaden discretion, 
such as the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States 
v. Booker. Although disparity is often viewed by politicians and judicial 
scholars negatively, I argue, based on my quantitative analysis as well as 
judges’ opinions collected from an original nationwide survey and live 
interviews, that such disparity correctly reflects local realities faced by 
district court judges in various regions across the country. 
* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Houston. This project was 
supported by award #2007-IJ-CX-0015 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, United States Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or 
recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the Department of Justice. I would like to thank federal district court judges across the 
country who responded to the district court survey and/or agreed to an interview to increase my 
understanding of sentencing reform. Without their willingness to take the time to answer my 
inquiries, this project would not have been possible. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sentencing law reform is a manifestation of the constant battle 
waged between politicians who want to appear tough on crime and 
judges who want to act independently to apply their expertise and 
judgment in adjudicating criminal cases. Politicians worldwide are 
concerned about what voters think, and this electoral connection1 makes 
them especially interested in the public’s opinion on issues concerning 
law, order, and security. As a result, legislators enact and amend criminal 
and sentencing laws at a constant pace in the hope of constraining judges 
deemed to be too soft on crime and a judicial branch deemed to be too 
independent. Sometimes, higher courts assert themselves in the reform 
process by ruling legislation unconstitutional or directing lower courts 
regarding interpretation of the law. 
Continuous reform and reaction to reforms are manifested 
throughout the federal and individual state sentencing systems, and 
sentencing reforms that are politically in favor at one time often are 
deemed out of favor at a later time. For example, in the last two decades 
stiff sentencing penalties aimed at limiting judicial discretion and 
providing tough penalties, especially to offenders involved in drug 
crimes, have predominated the criminal justice agenda. However, 
recently the U.S. Supreme Court found the federal Guidelines and many 
state sentencing systems unconstitutional.2 The Court’s decisions have 
coincided with economic challenges associated with maintaining a 
burgeoning prison system.3 Now state and federal legislators are 
considering less rigid penalties for some offenses to reduce prison 
overcrowding and the concurrent impact on state and federal budgets. 
The Federal Sentencing Guideline system provides a further example 
1. DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (2d ed. 2004) (arguing 
that Congressmen single-mindedly seek to be re-elected). As a result, politicians often advocate 
certain policies and legislative action in hopes of pleasing their constituency, such that they are re-
elected. For Mayhew, congressmen are not necessarily concerned with enacting good policy, but 
rather with enacting policy that will improve their re-election chances. Id. at 16. To be re-elected, 
congressmen engage in three specific activities: “advertising, credit claiming and position taking.” 
Id. at 73. When congressmen advocate and vote on legislation supporting or opposing a certain 
position they engage in all three of these activities. 
2. In a series of cases leading up to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the U.S. 
Supreme Court found sentencing schemes in the following states unconstitutional and required their 
modification. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (finding the California 
determinate sentencing law unconstitutional); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (finding 
the Washington state system violated the Sixth Amendment); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) 
(holding that the court must find that an aggravating factor under state law exists beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order for the defendant to be sentenced to death); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000) (finding the New Jersey system flawed). 
3. Sean Hayes, The End of Determinate Sentencing: How California’s Prison Problem Can 
be Solved with Quick Fixes and a Long Term Commission, Working paper of the California 
Sentencing and Corrections Policy Series, Stanford University Criminal Justice Center (2007). 
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of the swinging pendulum of sentencing reform and is the focus of this 
Article which tests the impact of the federal Guidelines and recent 
reforms on case outcomes. The current federal sentencing system was 
created in 1984 when Congress passed the U.S. Sentencing Reform Act.4
One of the purposes of this Act was to rein in what were thought to be 
recalcitrant district court judges whose sentencing decisions were largely 
inconsistent with one another.5 The Act created the use of Sentencing 
Guidelines requiring federal judges to choose sentences for specific 
crimes from a pre-determined range of possibilities. The U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines system, put in place by this Act, is thought to constrain 
district court judges in sentencing more than any other system in the 
United States or abroad. Although, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were 
applied to all federal criminal cases, Congress further restrained judicial 
discretion in 2003 only for the Supreme Court to completely emasculate 
the Guideline system in the landmark case of United States v. Booker.6
This article analyzes the Federal Guideline system and reform to this 
system in order to ascertain whether the intent behind the Guidelines and 
their reform was achieved.7 In this way, the article seeks to address the 
following questions: Did the Guidelines achieve their intended purposes? 
Did district court judges respond to legislative attacks on their discretion 
implicit in the Guidelines and their 2003 reforms? Can legislators really 
4. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. Although the Sentencing Reform Act was the first 
comprehensive piece of legislation which tackled disparity in federal sentencing, President Lyndon 
Johnson created a National Strategy on Crime in 1966 to deal with the problems related to the 
federal criminal code and sentencing system. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, REPORT 
TO CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
RESPONSE TO SECTION 401(M) OF PUBLIC LAW 108–21, B-2, at 3-5 (2003) [hereinafter USSC 
Report, 2003]. This strategy resulted in the creation of the Brown Commission which was tasked 
with revising the entire federal criminal code and reforming sentencing. Id.; see also, William W. 
Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton & John R. Steer, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold 
Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 365 (1991) (noting 
the work of the Brown Commission). One recommendation of the Brown Commission with lasting 
implications to the Sentencing Reform Act was the listing of authorized sentences for specific 
federal crimes. REP. NO. 97-307, 1st Sess., at 6 (1981). 
5. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 39 (1973) 
(providing one of the first criticisms of sentencing disparity due to district court judges’ unbridled 
discretion in sentencing). One cannot underestimate the criticism of Frankel, a federal judge and 
scholar regarding the discretion afforded to judges in sentencing prior to the Guidelines. He stated, 
“[t]he sentencing power of the judges are, in short, so far unconfined that, except for frequently 
monstrous maximum limits, they are effectively subject to no law at all.” Id. at 8. 
6. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
7. S. REP. NO. 98-225, 1st Sess. (1983) (providing the legislative history of the Sentencing 
Reform Act); USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, B-1 to B-5 (providing a succinct description of the 
legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the Sentencing Guidelines 
as well as the United States Sentencing Commission); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal 
Sentencing Reform: Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 291 (1993); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Yoh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative 
History of Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993) (providing a discussion of 
the legislative history and political discussion relating to the Guidelines). 
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control judicial discretion through sentencing guidelines, and if so, 
should they? Finally, should some disparity in sentencing prevail to 
allow for variations in regional culture? For example, certain regions, 
such as those along the southwest border of the United States, must deal 
with unique and heavy case loads related to criminal immigration 
violations. As a result, these regions may appropriately employ disparate 
sentencing practices from the rest of the regions in the United States with 
fewer of these types of cases. The questions addressed above are 
answered by a unique quantitative analysis of a small group of federal 
drug trafficking cases which are matched by similarity of case facts and 
defendants’ criminal history. The above questions also are analyzed 
qualitatively by reference to survey and interview responses. The results 
of both the quantitative and qualitative analysis show that disparity of 
sentencing can be controlled by politicians to some extent, is not as 
serious a harm as suggested by tough-on-crime politicians, and where 
disparity persists it may be appropriate. 
Specifically, this analysis will focus on whether the U. S. Sentencing 
Guideline scheme, as originally conceived, effectively constrained 
judges when sentencing defendants for federal drug crimes from 1999 to 
2006.8 Although many studies have been written on the effect of the 
Guidelines, no recent studies have employed a method controlling for 
case facts so that the effect of the Guidelines and changes to the 
Guideline scheme can be tested directly. This analysis not only compares 
judges’ sentencing decisions when they apply Guideline ranges in 
sentencing tables and depart from these ranges, but also focuses on how 
the most significant and recent changes in the Guideline scheme 
mandated by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. 
Booker affected case outcomes, departure rates, and disparity of 
decisions. This analysis is supplemented with information from
interviews and surveys of individual district court judges across the 
United States to provide insights into how district court judges perceive 
and react to constraints on their discretion. 
In Part II of this article, I review how politicians and higher courts 
control lower court judges by attempting to curtail their discretion. As 
seen from this review, most of the scholarly literature refers to 
intermediate appellate courts rather than trial courts as “lower courts.” 
As a result, this study’s focus on district court decision-making adds to a 
more general understanding of the thought processes of judges at the trial 
8. Data for this study was derived from the Inter-University Consortium of Political and 
Social Research (“ICPSR”), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. The ICPSR data used for this analysis are 
entitled “Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences” ICPSR study numbers 3106 (1999), 3496 
(2000), 3497 (2001), 4110 (2002), 4290 (2003), 4633 (2004), 4630 (2005), and 20120 (2006). Data 
files generated for this study on two federal drug crimes are available upon request of the author. 
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court level. In Part III, I provide a description of the Guidelines and how 
they can be used to answer the questions related to discretion and 
disparity addressed in this paper. In part IV, I examine recent changes to 
the Guideline scheme, including the PROTECT Act and U.S. v. Booker.
In parts V and VI respectively, I test hypotheses, provide results, and 
comment on their implications regarding the effectiveness of the 
Guidelines and their reforms. In part VII, I argue that policy makers 
should not view sentencing disparity due to judicial discretion and 
regional variations negatively. First, disparity of sentencing may be 
completely appropriate where judges face different caseloads and types. 
Second, in order for sentencing to remain individualistic rather than a 
mechanical application of the law to the facts, some disparity should be 
expected. 
II. CONTROLLING THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Rational choice and strategic interaction theories are largely used to 
explain how political institutions control the courts.9 These theories 
analyze how judges or politicians make strategic decisions based on how 
they believe other political actors will respond. Generally, the focus of 
these models is exclusively on how political institutions control either the 
Supreme Court or the judiciary as a whole.10 Some, however, focus on 
how legislators and higher courts control lower appellate courts. In this 
regard, scholars ask two general questions relating to whether legislators 
or higher courts can control lower courts’ decision-making processes. 
First, in the judicial decision-making literature, scholars inquire 
whether legislation effectively controls lower courts. Mathew 
McCubbins, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast11 show that legislatures use 
structure and process as a means of controlling these courts. These 
scholars suggest that politicians expand the federal judiciary in order to 
force the Supreme Court to alter doctrine in a way preferred by political 
officials.12 John DeFigueirido and Emerson Tiller also find that Congress 
9. LEE EPSTEIN & STEPHEN KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1997) (suggesting that 
Supreme Court justices make decisions based on their own self- interest as well as their beliefs about 
how other political actors will act). 
10. John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 1 (1990); Rafael Gely & Pablo Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court 
Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON & ORG.
263 (1991). 
11. McCubbins et al., Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the 
Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995) [hereinafter McCubbins, Politics]; see also McCubbins 
et al., Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 105 (2006) (extending 
prior studies to show the conditions under which politicians may change the size of the judiciary in 
order to control it). 
12. McCubbins, Politics, supra note 11. 
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controls the federal judiciary by its “ability to balance or stack the courts 
through the creation of federal judgeships.”13
Politicians also determine how judges make decisions on certain 
matters by including language in statutes that explicitly includes the 
standards for review that judges must employ when deciding cases and 
by stating what types of decisions they may review.14 Huber and Shipan 
argue that the length of statutes affects judicial discretion. Short statutes 
provide judges with fewer instructions regarding their decision-making 
and thus allow judges to use their own individual discretion. 15
Alternatively, longer statutes provide more detailed instructions about 
how judges should act and thus curtail discretion.16 Some scholars 
strongly oppose the view that law and process exclusively affect 
decision-making and instead espouse the attitudinal model, which posits 
that judges make decisions based on their policy or political preferences 
rather than strict adherence to the law.17 In the sentencing arena, 
Schanzenbach and Tiller18 and Cross and Tiller19 show that the 
compliance of lower courts is a function of the political composition and 
political proclivities of lower court judges via the court of appeals. 
Second, judicial scholars ask whether higher court precedent 
13. John DeFigueriredo & Emerson Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & ECON. 435, 435 
(1996) (noting that Congress is more inclined to expand the judiciary when the nominating president 
and confirming Senate are politically aligned). 
14. See McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative 
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 444–45 (1989) (“[O]ne 
potential means of protecting against judicial readjustment of policy is to use either explicit 
legislation or administrative procedures in an attempt to constrain judicial decisions.”).
15. JOHN HUBER & CHARLES SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION?: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 44–77, 176–83 (2002). 
16. Id. Huber and Shipan argue that the number of words present in a statute define how 
much discretion judges have. Id. at 44. For example, statutes with many words are supposed to put 
more constraints on judges’ discretion and statutes with fewer words are supposed to contain fewer 
constraints. Id. at 44–45. While Huber and Shipan correctly assert that the written law guides the 
amount of discretion that Congress provides judges, making this dependent on the number of words 
in a given statute is not a proper measure of discretion. Some statutes may appear short because they 
incorporate other, possibly more specific statutes, defining judges’ discretion. Likewise, some 
statutes may be very long because they include many details unrelated to judicial discretion. 
17. JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL (1993); see also JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
18. Max Schanzenbach & Emerson Tiller, Strategic Judging under the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (2006) (showing that 
the political composition of both circuit courts and district courts affects sentencing decisions). The 
authors find that judges appointed by Republicans issued higher sentences for street crimes and 
lower sentences for white collar and environmental crimes than their Democratic counterparts. Id. at 
52. These authors also analyze how the political composition of the circuits in which they sit affects 
district court judges’ sentences. Id. at 44–52.
19. Frank Cross & Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Court of Appeals, 107 YALE L. J. 2155, 2155–76 (1998). 
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effectively controls lower courts. On one side of the debate, scholars 
believe that lower court judges defy precedent issued by higher courts.20
In many instances higher courts fail to sanction these lower courts for 
non-compliance because there are too many lower courts and cases to 
monitor. McCubbins, Noll and Weingast show that to deal with its 
inability to fully monitor all lower courts, the Supreme Court expands 
judicial doctrine to widen the range of acceptable decisions near its ideal 
policy.21 McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast specifically state: 
When the Supreme Court’s resources are extensive and most lower 
courts do not disagree substantially with the Court, the Court can enforce 
a doctrine that focuses narrowly on its preferred interpretation. In 
contrast, when most lower courts differ substantially from the preferred 
doctrine of the Supreme Court, the problem of noncompliance becomes 
important. Our theory suggests that the Supreme Court will expand the 
range of lower court decisions that it finds acceptable when faced with 
substantial noncompliance by the lower courts. By expanding the latitude 
allowed under its precedents, the Court both cajoles some lower bench 
jurists to abide by the new precedents and isolates those who do not. The 
Court can then focus its attention on the most egregiously 
nonconforming lower court decisions, and on the issues it most cares 
about.22
By cajoling lower courts to comply with Supreme Court doctrine, the 
higher court is in fact curtailing the independence of lower court judges, 
who have their own individual preferences and ideology. Thus, within 
the judiciary, lower court judges are arguably not independent of senior 
appellate judges or the preferences of these judges. In this way, these 
authors find that stare decisis is a “self-enforcing equilibrium in strategic 
interaction for the Supreme Court and lower courts” and that the greater 
the potential for non-compliance by lower courts, the more lax is judicial 
doctrine.23
On the other side of the debate regarding higher court precedent are 
20. Many scholars believe that lower court judges are unconcerned with being reversed, and 
consequently the fear of reversal does not drive their actions. See JACK PELATSON, FIFTY-EIGHT 
LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1971) (providing one of 
the first analyses that show that district court judges did not comply with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
precedent in desegregation cases); B.C. Canon & D. Jaros, External Variables, Institutional 
Structure and Dissent on State Supreme Courts, 4 POLITY 185 (1974); see also David Klein & 
Robert Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 579, 602 (2003) (suggesting that while lower courts seem to comply with higher courts, it is 
not due to a fear of reversal from these higher courts, but rather due to shortcuts judges must make in 
order to handle heavy case loads). 
21. McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule 
of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636–40 (1995) (explaining how the Supreme Court “induces” the 
lower courts to comply with the Supreme Court’s own doctrinal choices).
22. Id. at 1634. 
23. Id. at 1635. 
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scholars who generally believe that lower courts are loyal to and comply 
with higher court precedent.24 These scholars not only vary in 
methodology, but also differ in the justifications provided for why these 
courts comply. Songer, Segal, and Cameron argue that the Supreme 
Court controls the discretion of circuit court judges due to its position in 
the judicial hierarchy.25 These scholars find that in search and seizure 
cases, the courts of appeal are highly congruent (i.e. follow Supreme 
Court policy) and responsive (i.e. change policy when the Supreme Court 
changes). Songer, Segal, and Cameron conclude that in the limited 
instances when the courts of appeals fail to comply, they are prevented 
from excessive shirking as a result of litigants who sound fire alarms 
when the lower appeals courts’ interpretation diverges too greatly from 
the Supreme Court.26
For some scholars, arguing that lower courts comply with higher 
court precedent, compliance is due to lower court judges’ fear of reversal 
by a higher court.27 Alternatively, Klein and Hume suggest that lower 
24. Many political scientists, studying public law and judicial politics, find that a variety of 
lower courts follow the precedent set by higher courts. Although many lawyers assume that lower 
courts follow higher court precedent, some scholars analyze the theory behind this assumption and 
also test it using quantitative methods. See Lawrence Baum, Responses of Federal District Courts to 
Court of Appeals Politics: An Exploration, 33 W. POL. Q. 217, 223 (1980) (assessing how well 
district courts follow precedent set by courts of appeals); Sara Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: 
An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. 
POL. 534, 534 (2002) (finding that “unanimity, complexity, and the age of overruled precedent, as 
well as the likelihood of Supreme Court review,” all affect how lower courts respond to Supreme 
Court precedent); Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817, 872 (1994) (reviewing the various theoretical arguments supporting the necessity 
of lower courts to follow higher court precedent); John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Law 
of Libel: Compliance by Lower Federal Courts 33 W. POL. Q. 502, 517 (1980) (showing that district 
courts and courts of appeals comply with Supreme Court precedent in libel suits); Charles Johnson, 
Law, Politics and Judicial Decision Making: Lower Federal Court Uses of Supreme Court 
Decisions, 21(2) LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 325, 338 (1987) (indicating that lower courts tend to follow 
the Supreme Court “if facts, issues, or (especially) litigants are generally similar between cases in 
the two courts”); Donald Songer and Reginald Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and 
Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Court of Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297, 
313(1990) (showing that the courts of appeals have high rates of compliance with two major U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions). However, courts of appeals are less likely to follow Supreme Court 
reasoning than lower district courts. Johnson, supra note 24, at 338; see also, SARAH BENESH, THE 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIERARCHY OF 
JUSTICE (2002); Donald Songer, Jeffrey Segal & Charles Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: 
Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 
673 (1994); Donald Songer, The Impact of Supreme Court Trends in Economic Policy Making in the 
United States Courts of Appeals, 49 J. POL. 830 (1987). 
25. Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 24, at 673–96.
26. Id.
27. Evan Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior 
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77 (1994) (stating that there is much anecdotal 
knowledge suggesting that judges fear being reversed because their colleagues will not respect them 
and that high rates of reversal may hinder professional advancement); see also H.W. Elder, Property 
Rights Structures and Criminal Courts: An Analysis of State Criminal Courts, 7 INT’L. REV. L. &
ECON. 21 (1987); W. Hansen, Robert Johnson, & Isaac Unah, Specialized Courts, Bureaucratic 
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court compliance is derived from shortcuts for coping with increased 
caseloads and the desire “to reach legally sound decisions.”28 Still others 
believe that lower court compliance is due to lower court judges’ training 
or belief that they are required to follow precedent set by higher courts. 
Compliance is viewed as a manifestation of respect for higher court 
authority,29 or as a belief that to do so is a major part of their job as 
judges. Alternatively, Johnson30 and Kornhauser31 imply that following 
higher court decisions results in more consistent or accurate decisions. 
This Article specifically tests whether lower federal courts comply 
with legislative mandates in the form of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
and reform as well as with Supreme Court precedent. This is done in two 
ways. First, sentencing cases, with identical fact patterns, where 
Guideline sentencing ranges are applied are compared to cases where 
Guideline ranges are not applied. Second, changes in the sentencing 
Guideline scheme mandated by both Congress and the Supreme Court 
that restricted or expanded discretion are analyzed. For this part of the 
analysis, the following changes to the Guidelines are tested: (1) The 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act of 2003,32 [“the PROTECT Act”] and the 
controversial Feeney Amendment, in which Congress restricted the 
ability of judges and prosecutors to depart from sentencing guidelines, 
(2) Blakely v. Washington,33 in which the Supreme Court found that the 
Washington state guideline system was unconstitutional, and (3) United 
States v. Booker,34 in which the Supreme Court found the federal 
Guideline system unconstitutional and converted the Guidelines from 
mandatory to advisory constraints on judges’ sentencing discretion. The 
PROTECT Act limited judicial discretion while the two Supreme Court 
Agencies and the Politics of U.S. Trade Policy, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 529 (1995). 
28. Klein & Hume, supra note 20, at 602; see also VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL, JUDGING 
ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING (2006); BENESH,
supra note 24. 
29. See generally, Lawrence Baum, Lower Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions: 
Reconsidering a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208 (1977); Richard Pacelle & Lawrence Baum, 
Supreme Court Authority in the Judiciary: A Study of Remands, 20 AM. POL. Q. 169 (1992). 
30. Charles A. Johnson, Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making: Lower Federal Court 
Uses of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 325, 338–39 (1987) (suggesting that 
judges often follow the legal reasoning in precedent as opposed to following personal political 
philosophy). 
31. Lewis Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and 
Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1605–07 (1995) (viewing the judicial 
system as a team that “seeks to maximize the expected number of ‘correct’ answers”).
32. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21. See USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, app. B (analyzing the 
complete legislative background of the PROTECT Act). 
33. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
34. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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cases expanded it. The legal changes are used to analyze whether lower 
courts comply with both mandates from Congress and the Supreme 
Court. 
III. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A TEST CASE IN 
LIMITING DISCRETION BY LIMITING JUDICIAL CHOICES
Prior to the Guideline system implementation in 1989, judges had 
broad discretion to determine criminal sentences and parole boards had 
the power to reduce these sentences by freeing defendants from prison 
after only serving part of their sentences. While this system had certain 
advantages, allowing judges to fashion sentences based on defendants’ 
education, work experience, age, and likelihood of committing other 
crimes;35 many in the legal community were concerned with the 
disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants across the nation. 
This concern, exhibited in the 1950s and 1960s, manifested itself in 
Congressional debates concerning the federal criminal code and 
sentencing disparity.36 This in turn led to the introduction of substantial
sentencing reform legislation by Senator Edward Kennedy in 1975.37
After significant bipartisan efforts, as part of the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984, Congress finally enacted the concept of sentencing guidelines 
and established the United States Sentencing Commission (“USSC”), an 
independent agency of the judicial branch. The Guidelines, however, did 
not become effective until 1989, when the Supreme Court found that the 
USSC and the Guidelines were constitutional. In Mistretta v. United 
States,38 the Supreme Court held that in establishing the USSC and 
35. To supplement my understanding of judicial decision-making in sentencing, I conducted 
interviews of district court judges in the Southern, Eastern, and Central judicial districts of California 
between May 2007 and June 2008. During an interview, one senior-status district court judge, who 
had served both prior to and after the enactment of the federal Guidelines, stated he had enjoyed the 
flexibility of the pre-Guideline system allowing him to give young defendants suspended sentences 
after serving one or two days in county jail so as to dissuade them from committing further crimes. 
Interview with federal district court judge in S.D. California. (May 9, 2007). 
36. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, app. B; William Wilkins, Phyllis Newton & John 
Steer, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing 
Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 366 (1991). 
37. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, B-3.
38. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). In Mistretta, the Supreme Court held that the power of the United 
States Sentencing Commission (USSC) to set Sentencing Guidelines for federal courts was neither 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, nor a violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine. 
  The original case was brought by a defendant indicted in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Missouri. Mistretta 488 U.S. at 370. This defendant argued that the 
Guidelines were invalid because the manner in which the USSC had been created violated the 
doctrine of separation of powers and that Congress had delegated excessive legislative authority to 
the USSC in relation to its powers to set guidelines. Id. The District Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Guidelines. Id. Although the defendant originally filed a notice of appeal to 
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allowing it to create the Guidelines, Congress had violated neither 
doctrine of separation of powers nor non-delegation.39
In enacting the Guidelines and amendments, the USSC and the 
legislature were given almost exclusive authority to shape how judges 
could make decisions for certain types of federal criminal cases. In other 
words, the USSC and Congress could specifically mandate what factors 
judges could consider in sentencing decisions and could limit their 
choice of sentences. Pursuant to the United States Code, amendments to 
the Guidelines suggested by the USSC become enforceable if Congress 
does not affirmatively overturn them within a 180-day waiting period.40
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, both the defendant and the prosecution 
subsequently petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. Id. at 361. 
  In an opinion by Justice Blackmun joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, Marshall, 
Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and in pertinent part Brennan, the Supreme Court held that in 
establishing the USSC and allowing it to create Sentencing Guidelines, Congress had not violated 
the non-delegation doctrine, because Congress itself had previously defined important criminal 
offenses and established gradations of punishment. As to the non-delegation doctrine, the Supreme 
Court indicated the following: 
[The Guidelines] do not bind or regulate the primary conduct of the public or vest in the 
Judicial Branch the legislative responsibility for establishing minimum and maximum 
penalties for every crime. They do no more than fetter the discretion of sentencing judges 
to do what they have done for generations–impose sentences within the broad limits 
established by Congress. 
. . . . 
. . . Judicial contribution to the enterprise of creating rules to limit the discretion of 
sentencing judges does not enlist the resources or reputation of the Judicial Branch in 
either the legislative business of determining what conduct should be criminalized or the 
executive business of enforcing the law. 
Id. at 407. According to the Supreme Court, the USSC’s Guidelines were similar to internal 
regulations enacted by courts. Id. at 391. 
  Scalia was the lone Justice to dissent to the substance of the majority opinion. His dissent 
was based only on the non-delegation doctrine. Justice Scalia wrote that the Sentencing Reform Act 
that established the USSC was an invalid delegation of legislative power and authority because the 
USSC’s rule-making power in establishing Guidelines was a legislative power and not a part of a 
valid exercise of judicial or executive power. Id. at 420-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia opined that 
Congress established the Commission only to exercise law-making powers that are exclusively 
reserved for the legislature. Id. at 422 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
  The majority also ruled that the establishment of the USSC in the judicial branch did not 
violate the separation of powers doctrine for several reasons, but most importantly because the 
functions of the USSC to establish rules and make judgments about sentencing were deemed 
appropriate for the judicial branch. Id. at 408. Furthermore, the creation of the USSC did not violate 
the separation of powers doctrine because the USSC was not a court and did not hear individual 
cases and thus did not improperly unite judicial and political power. Id.
  The effect of the Mistretta decision has been far reaching. Sentencing Guidelines 
established by the USSC and upheld by Mistretta and their amendments were applied to 
approximately 700,000 federal criminal cases between 1989 and 2005 when the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), found that the Guidelines were unconstitutional and 
rendered their further use as advisory only, rather than mandatory constraints on district court 
judges. 
39. Id. at 412. 
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006). 
12 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 24
The Guidelines enacted by the USSC indicate how much discretion 
judges can exercise depending on the fact pattern of particular cases and 
the role that prosecutors take in advocating Guideline departures. 
The Guidelines and their amendments have been applied to more 
than 700,000 federal criminal cases between 1989 and 2005,41 when the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Booker42 found the Guidelines 
unconstitutional and rendered their further use to be only advisory, rather 
than mandatory constraints on district court judges. Until the Booker 
decision the USSC used the Guidelines as a vehicle for constraining the 
authority of district court judges by specifying the actual amount of 
discretion that judges had to sentence defendants in particular types of 
cases. Through Guidelines, the USSC and Congress specifically chose to 
limit federal judges’ discretion by mandating that judges sentence 
defendants to specific amounts of time in prison which fall within a 
certain range of possible sentences in a sentencing table.43 Although the 
Guidelines limited district court discretion, they also limited the ability 
of circuit courts to review district court sentences. Most sentences were 
reached by plea bargains (studied extensively in this article), and in many 
cases defendants waived their rights to appeal to a higher court in the 
plea bargain itself. 
41. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION (2005) 2, http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf. 
42. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
43. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A (2005). Below is a partial depiction 
of Sentencing Table, Offense levels range from 1 to 43, with 1 referring to the least serious crimes or 
facts. 
Table N1.  Partial depiction of sentencing table in months in prison (Source: USSC) 
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Specifically, lower district court judges determine criminal sentences 
by using the USSC’s sentencing table. The table has two axes: a 
horizontal axis which determines a defendant’s criminal history category 
and a vertical axis which classifies the severity of a defendant’s offense. 
To determine the sentence of any offense under the Guidelines, judges 
first must determine a defendant’s criminal history category. Second, 
lower court judges must determine the offense level ranging from 1 to 
43. The Guidelines categorize crimes by type and the offense level is 
based on whether the crime involved certain additional factors, such as 
the presence of a firearm or a victim. The offense level may be further 
altered depending on defendant’s role in the crime and his acceptance of 
responsibility.44
Once these two determinations have been made, the district court 
judge (until the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Booker) was required 
to sentence a defendant to a prison term that fell within the range 
determined by the intersection of the criminal history and offense level 
axes of the sentencing table. In other words, the sentencing table was a 
mandatory constraint on judicial discretion. In this way, judicial 
discretion in sentencing decisions was limited to sentencing choices 
defined by the table ranges that varied as little as six months (i.e. 0 to 6 
months or 24-30 months) to those that varied by as much as the length of 
time between 360 months (30 years) to a defendant’s natural life. As a
result, discretion to sentence was “cabined within a guideline range that 
may be a small fraction of the statutory limit.”45 The legislature, upon the 
recommendation of the USSC, determines this range specifically. 
Furthermore, when particular offenses have statutory minimum or 
maximum sentences, the statutory limit is generally controlling. 
However, in certain instances, judges may apply a “safety valve” 
provision that allows them to sentence below the statutory minimum. I 
used cases in which judges applied sentencing table ranges as my control 
group to compare to a group of cases where even more discretion is 
afforded through the use of departures. 
The Sentencing Guidelines also allow judges to exercise their 
discretion and depart from the Guideline ranges in very limited 
circumstances.46 The limited use of departures has been duly recorded by 
44. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 3 (2005). 
45. LUCIEN B. CAMPBELL & HENRY BEMPORAD, AN INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL 
GUIDELINE SENTENCING 1 (8th ed. 2004) (providing a description of how attorneys should apply the 
Federal Guidelines). 
46. The only Guideline departures analyzed in this paper are those that are “judge-driven.” It 
should be noted, however, that there are “prosecutor-driven” departures where prosecutors and not 
judges must initially ask for the departure by motion. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5K1.1 (2005). One example of this type of departure exists when prosecutors ask judges to depart 
downward from the Guidelines to reward defendants who substantially assisted the government. 18 
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the USSC which has shown that decisions involving departures 
constitute just a small percent of all such sentencing decisions.47
According to the Guidelines, district court judges may sentence outside 
of the fixed ranges or depart due to “specific offender characteristics” 
including age, education, and socio-economic background.48 Although 
judges may sentence below the Guidelines based on these specific 
offender characteristics, the USSC determined that these factors “are not 
ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be 
outside the applicable guideline range.”49 It should be remembered that 
the Guidelines were originally adopted to avoid disparities in sentences 
and to treat similar cases similarly.50 Consequently, the USSC suggested 
that special offender characteristics should not be considered except in 
certain unusual cases.51
Departures also may be warranted when “the court finds that there 
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, 
not adequately taken into consideration by the USSC in formulating the 
Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
described.”52 The Guidelines include a list of twenty specific exceptions 
which allow judges to depart from the Guidelines.53 Some of these 
U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006). Substantial assistance departures are warranted only if the government 
requests such a departure by motion and the judge grants the motion. See Stefanos Bibas, 
Federalism: Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2005) 
(showing that whether departures from substantial assistance are warranted is largely driven by 
prosecutorial, rather than judicial discretion and may vary with regional practices of prosecutors’ 
offices). 
47. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, at 31. 
48. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2, pt. H, introductory cmt. (2008). Guideline 
§§ 5H1.1 to 5H1.12 list the following specific offender characteristics: 
1) age, 2) education and vocational skills, 3) mental and emotional conditions, 4) physical 
condition including drug or alcohol dependence or abuse; gambling addiction, 5) 
employment record, 6) family ties and responsibilities 7) role in the offense, 8) criminal 
history, 9) dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood, 10) race, sex, national 
origin, creed, religion and socio-economic status, 11) military, civic, charitable or public 
service, employment related contributions, record of prior good works, 12) lack of 
guidance as a youth, 13) relief from disability. 
49. Id. ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt.
50. Id. § 1A1.1, p.s. (“Congress sought uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide 
disparity in sentences imposed by different federal courts for similar conduct by similar offenders.”).
51. Id. ch.5, pt. H1.1. For specific offender characteristics, see the policy statement at page 
444.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3553b(1). Section 3553 is now used as the legal basis given by district court 
judges for most departures after U.S. v. Booker rendered the guidelines advisory. 
53. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K2.1-2.24 (2008). The twenty-three 
“other” grounds for departure found in §§ 5K2.1-5K2.21 include: 
1) death, 2) physical injury, 3) extreme psychological injury, 4) abduction or unlawful 
restrain, 5) property damage or loss, 6) weapons and dangerous instrumentalities, 7) 
disruption of governmental function, 8) extreme conduct, 9) criminal purpose 10) 
victim’s conduct, 11) lesser harms, 12) coercion and duress, 13) diminished capacity, 14) 
public welfare, 15) voluntary disclosure of offense, 16) semiautomatic firearms capable 
of accepting large capacity magazine, 17) violent street gangs 18) post-sentencing 
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reasons warrant sentences above the sentencing range, some below the 
Guideline table range, and some both above and below the range. One of 
the most significant of these departure reasons allows judges to depart 
where there are certain circumstances of a kind not adequately taken into 
consideration.54 Finally, the government and defendants may reach a plea 
agreement that allows for a sentence outside of the sentencing ranges.55
However, such plea agreements are not binding and the judge has 
discretion to disregard them entirely.56 Judge driven departures serve as a 
treatment or test group that I analyze. 
IV.  CHANGES IN THE GUIDELINE SCHEME
Not only does this article include tests on the effect of the Sentencing 
Guideline scheme on sentencing outcomes, but also includes tests 
concerning how changes in the law governing this scheme affect 
sentences, disparity, and departure rates. This is done using an 
interrupted time series to test the applicability of the law after three 
major changes to the Guideline scheme described below. Interrupted 
time series analysis helps scholars analyze how events, such as changes 
in the law, affect the variables of interest over time.
A.  The PROTECT Act/Feeney Amendment: Legislation Restricting 
Judicial Discretion 
On April 30, 2003, Congress passed the PROTECT Act.57 Heralded 
as the most significant amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines since 
their inception, Congress enacted the PROTECT Act because of a 
growing concern that judges and prosecutors had increasingly been using 
departures to avoid the Guidelines’ sentencing mandates especially in 
cases along the southwestern border and in cases involving child 
exploitation.58 Further, in enacting this law, Congress also voiced 
concern that federal prosecutors were using departures and case facts as 
rehabilitative efforts, 19) aberrant behavior, 20) dismissed and uncharged conduct. 21) 
Specific offender characteristics for downward departure in child crimes and sexual 
offenses, 22) discharged terms of imprisonment, 23) commission of offense while 
wearing or displaying unauthorized or counterfeit insignia or uniform. 
Note: section 5K2.15 was deleted. Further, this list of grounds for departures has changed slightly 
since the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines as referenced in the legislative history of each 
section referenced. See pages 459 to 468. 
54. Id. § 5K2.0(2). 
55. Id. §§ 6B1.1-1.2. 
56. Id. § 6B1.1. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A). 
57. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21 [hereinafter “PROTECT Act”].
58. See generally USSC report, 2003, supra note 4. 
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bargaining chips to get the sentences they desired, in blatant disregard of 
Congressional intent as demonstrated in the Sentencing Guidelines.59
The PROTECT Act had four major provisions. First, the Act sought 
to prohibit departures related to crimes against children and sex 
offenses.60 Second, it changed the standard of review by appellate courts 
for “sentencing matters” to de novo, while continuing the standard of 
clearly erroneous for factual determinations.61 Third, the controversial 
Feeney Amendment required district courts to provide specific written 
reasons for departures from the Guidelines.62 Fourth, the Act enhanced 
the pre-existing requirements that courts report on sentences to the 
USSC.63 The Commission published the related amendments to the 
Guidelines on May 16, August 1, and October 21, 2003.64
Although the PROTECT Act/Feeney Amendment changed the 
departure scheme generally, Congress directed that the USSC thoroughly 
review all sentencing practices according to the intent of the legislature 
and that it make its own recommendations as to specific changes in the 
Guidelines.65 On October 8, 2003, the USSC adopted emergency 
amendments effective on October 21, 2003.66 The amendments that the 
USSC proposed with the acquiescence of Congress, as well as actions 
taken by U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, in conjunction with the 
PROTECT Act, substantially changed the Guideline departure system. 
To meet Congressional concerns regarding departures, the USSC 
59. See generally USSC report, 2003, supra note 4, app. B (providing a history and analysis 
of the issues giving rise to the PROTECT Act); Interviews of district court judges in S.D. Cal. (May 
7 and May 11, 2007) (confirming that prosecutors’ charging practices had indeed resulted in 
unwarranted sentencing disparity and that prosecutors in certain districts were so lenient as to ignore 
the Guidelines’ intent and purposes). 
60. PROTECT Act, supra note 57 § 401(b). 
61. Id. § 401(d)(2). 
62. Id. § 401(c); see Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges Changed Their Sentencing 
Practices? The Shaky Empirical Foundations of the Feeney Amendment, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 1, 10 (2005) (providing a complete discussion of the Feeney Amendment). Although the Act 
placed more rigid restrictions on reporting departures, the USSC had always had a Congressional 
mandate to collect and disseminate data on sentences imposed and district court judges’ use of and 
reasons for departures. See 28 U.S.C. §§994(w), 995(a)(8) (2008). 
63. PROTECT Act, supra note 57 § 401(h). 
64. Notice of (1)(A)(i) Congressional Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines Made 
Directly by the PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108–21, and Effective April 30, 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 
26,960 (May 16, 2003). The Commission stated that these amendments did not comply with the 
normal notice and public comment rules and deadlines because Congress enacted the changes 
effective on April 30, 2003, making “it impracticable to publish the conforming amendments in the
Federal Register to provide an opportunity for public comment before the congressional 
amendments became effective.” Id. (Emphasis added). Further amendments were published at 68 
Federal Register 39173 (August 1, 2003) and 68 Federal Register 60153-60176 (October 21, 2003).  
See, http://www.ussc.gov/notice.htm for a complete list of the amendments and federal register 
notices. 
65. Id. § 401(m). 
66. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, at v. 
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eliminated nine grounds for departures. Two of these grounds related to 
criminal history categories and two related to departures based on 
aberrant behavior. The remaining five now “forbidden” departures 
included 
[1] the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the offense; [2] 
the defendant’s aggravating or mitigating role in the offense; [3] the 
defendant’s decision, by itself, to plead guilty to the offense or to enter 
into a plea agreement with respect to the offense; [4] the defendant’s 
fulfillment of restitution obligations only to the extent required by law; 
and [5] the defendant’s addiction to gambling.67
The USSC amendments also increased restrictions for using 
departures based on multiple factors, a defendant’s family ties and 
responsibilities, conduct of the victim, coercion and duress, and 
diminished capacity.68
While the PROTECT Act required the USSC to draft extensive 
amendments to the Guideline system, it also directed the Department of 
Justice to enact detailed policies and procedures to ensure that the 
Guidelines would be followed by federal prosecutors when designing 
plea bargains and that assistant U.S. attorneys would oppose departures if 
they were “not supported by the facts and the law.”69 As a result, then 
U.S. Attorney Ashcroft also required attorneys to affirmatively oppose 
sentencing adjustments and downward departures that were not 
consistent with the facts and the law and to follow a more rigorous 
appeals protocol.70
Most controversially, as directed by Congress in the PROTECT Act, 
Ashcroft established a system for reporting to Congress how individual 
federal judges handled sentencing. One commentator claimed “that last 
mandate to monitor downward departures was particularly worrisome to 
judges, who saw it as an intimidation tactic and a serious encroachment 
on the independence of the judiciary.”71 In fact, several district court 
judges expressed anger at the PROTECT Act and one judge saw it as a 
direct threat from a co-equal branch of government.72 The U.S. Judicial 
Conference opposed the Amendment publicly.73 It has been suggested 
67. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, at vi, 19–20.
68. Id. at vii, 19. 
69. Id. at 10. 
70. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U. S. Dep’t of Justice, to all 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys regarding Departmental Guidance on Sentencing Recommendations and 
Appeals (July 28, 2003), 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/ci_03_32/$FILE/AG_Guidance_Stcg_Recs.pdf. 
71. Dan Christensen, The Short Life of the Feeney Amendment, DAILY BUS. REV., Jan. 24, 
2005), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1105968948840. 
72. Interview with U.S. District Court Judge from the C.D. of Cal. (Nov. 29, 2007). 
73. Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Sentencing Commission’s 
Response to the Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 98, 98 (2003). 
18 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 24
that the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Booker may have been 
motivated in part by Congress’s strict monitoring of judges under the 
PROTECT Act.74
On September 22, 2003, Ashcroft distributed a more detailed 
memorandum regarding policy changes consistent with the PROTECT 
Act.75 This memorandum reiterated that prosecutors should allow 
departures in only very “rare” circumstances and set forth “limited” 
exceptions for allowing departures.76 Further, Ashcroft ordered 
prosecutors not to “fact bargain” or accept a plea agreement.
B.  Blakely and Booker: Supreme Court Cases Augmenting Judicial 
Discretion 
As stated above, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines became effective 
in 1989. From that time, until the decision in United States v. Booker on
January 12, 2005, the Guidelines were deemed mandatory constraints on 
judicial decision-making. The mandatory nature of the Guidelines was 
later called into question in the Supreme Court case of Blakely v. 
Washington,77 which challenged the Washington State Sentencing 
Guideline scheme. In this case, the defendant had plead guilty to 
kidnapping his estranged wife.78 The State recommended a sentence 
within the Guideline range of forty-nine to fifty-three months.79
However, after hearing the wife’s account of the kidnapping, the judge 
sentenced the defendant to ninety months, which was thirty-seven 
months greater than the maximum prescribed by the guidelines.80 After 
the defendant objected to this increase, the judge held a three-day bench 
hearing to take testimony, but still chose to uphold the exceptional 
sentence based on deliberate cruelty.81
The Supreme Court in Blakely explicitly stated that its decision was 
based on the application of the prior rule it had enunciated in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey82 which was that “other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
74. See Christensen, supra note 71. 
75. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U. S. Dep’t of Justice, to all 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys regarding Department Principles for Implementing an Expedited 
Disposition or “Fast Track” Prosecution Program in a District (September 22, 2003), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ag-092203.pdf. 
76. Id. at 3. 
77. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 523 (2000) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (previously calling the federal guidelines into question). 
78. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298. 
79. Id. at 298. 
80. Id. at 300. 
81. Id.
82. Id. at 301. 
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statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”83 The Court applied Apprendi to the defendant’s case 
despite the fact that it involved a plea bargain rather than a jury trial, 
because the defendant had not admitted the facts leading to the judge’s 
elevated sentence in the plea bargain.84
While Blakely involved a state guideline scheme, the Court’s 
dissenters questioned, but did not decide, the issue of whether the 
Federal Guidelines, similar to the Washington Guidelines, were 
constitutional as mandatory constraints. In her dissent, Justice O’Connor, 
joined by Justice Breyer, emphasized the negative impact that Blakely
would have on the Federal guideline system. O’Connor stated:
The legacy of today’s opinion, whether intended or not, will be the 
consolidation of sentencing power in the State and Federal Judiciaries. 
The Court says to Congress and state legislatures: If you want to 
constrain the sentencing discretion of judges and bring some uniformity 
to sentencing, it will cost you –dearly. Congress and States, faced with 
the burdens imposed by the extension of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000), to the present context, will either trim or eliminate 
altogether their sentencing guidelines schemes and, with them, 20 years 
of sentencing reform. It is thus of little moment that the majority does not 
expressly declare guidelines schemes unconstitutional, ante, at 308; for 
as residents of “Apprendi-land” are fond of saying, “the relevant inquiry 
is one not of form but of effect.” Apprendi, supra, at 494; Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (SCALIA, J., concurring). The “effect” 
of today’s decision will be greater judicial discretion and less uniformity 
in sentencing.85
Although Blakely did not challenge the Federal Guidelines, 
following this decision, many district court judges subsequently refused 
to use the Guidelines to sentence defendants, reasoning that Blakely dicta 
showed that the Guidelines were unconstitutional86
Sixth months after Blakely, in United States v. Booker,87 the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
also applied to cases involving the federal Sentencing Guidelines. 88
83. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
84. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303–304.
85. Id. at 314 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
86. See Memorandum from Kelly Land (Staff Attorney) to Tim McGrath (Staff Director), 
Re: Office of General Counsel’s Blakely Database (November 30, 2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sc_cases/11_30_04.pdf (enumerating district courts’ decisions that questioned 
the constitutionality and continued application of the guidelines in individual cases immediately 
following Blakely).
87. U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
88. It was no coincidence that Booker was decided six months after the Blakely decision. 
After diverse lower court reaction to this decision, Congress and the executive requested the 
Supreme Court to expedite a decision on the constitutionality of the Federal Guidelines. See Timothy 
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Booker involved two lower court decisions. In defendant Booker’s case, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court had violated Apprendi by 
sentencing the defendant to prison time greater than the Guideline range, 
which was based on additional findings made by the judge under the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.89 In defendant Fanfan’s case, 
the lower court refused to add time to the sentence, despite findings of 
additional facts that allegedly warranted a greater sentence based on 
Blakely.90 In Booker, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that Blakely did 
indeed apply to the Federal Guidelines. The Court also reaffirmed the 
Apprendi rule that any additional facts supporting a sentence greater than 
the Federal Guideline maximum must be admitted by a defendant in a 
plea agreement or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.91
While Booker held that the Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial, this did not result in the demise of the 
Guideline system. Instead, the Justices reasoned that severing the section 
of the Guidelines rendering them mandatory would remedy the Sixth 
Amendment problem they had identified.92 As a result, Booker converted 
the Guidelines from mandatory constraints on judicial discretion to 
purely advisory.93 In essence, the Justices argued that faced with the 
Sixth Amendment challenge, Congress would not have intended to 
invalidate the entire Federal Guideline scheme, but would seek to 
preserve it in any way possible.94 For the Justices in Booker, such 
preservation was only possible by rendering the scheme advisory.95 The 
Supreme Court’s conversion of the Guidelines to advisory constraints 
also ended the Congressional requirements of reporting adverse 
departures of individual sentencing judges to Congress as required by the 
PROTECT Act.96
In Booker’s wake, district court judges were instructed to use the 
now advisory Sentencing Guidelines as one of the many factors to 
consider when determining the appropriateness of a defendant’s 
sentence.97 Furthermore, the Supreme Court mandated a 
Lynch, One Cheer for U.S. v. Booker, 2004-05 CATO SUP. CT. REV., 223 (2005); Lyle Denniston, 
Justices Agree to Consider Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, at A14. 
89. Booker, 543 U.S. at 222–23.
90. Id. at 220. 
91. Id. at 268. 
92. Id. at 227. 
93. Id. at 233. 
94. Id. at 249. 
95. Id.at 246. District court judges have emphasized the conversion of the Guidelines from 
mandatory to advisory constraints. In sentencing hearings I observed on May 9 and May 18, 2007 in 
the District Court for the Southern District of California, judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys 
always prefaced reference to guidelines as “advisory” (i.e. “the Advisory Guidelines”).
96. Christensen, supra note 71. 
97. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). 
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“reasonableness” standard for appellate review of district court 
sentences.98 Subsequent to the decision in Booker, the definition of 
reasonableness was addressed by the circuit courts in a variety of 
conflicting and controversial ways.99 Finally, in Kimbrough v. United 
States100 and Gall v. United States101 the Supreme Court expanded 
district court discretion by providing guidance on the meaning of 
reasonable sentences. Although outside of the scope of this article, the 
Supreme Court’s 2007 decisions in Kimbrough and Gall broadened 
district court discretion and signaled that after Booker, courts of appeals 
should give district courts’ sentences great deference.102
V. TESTING THE EFFECTS OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINE SCHEME
Studies of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,103 of which there are 
many, analyze different crimes and case facts together, controlling only 
for a limited number of case variables. However, these studies fail to 
control for the vast majority of case facts that vary among seemingly 
similar cases and that would dictate different outcomes. As a result, 
almost all prior analyses suffer from serious omitted variable bias.104 In 
98. Booker, 543 U.S. at 262. 
99. See Selected Guideline Application decisions by circuit at 
www.ussc.gov/training/court.htm. 
100. 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007). 
101. 128 S. Ct. 586, 602 (2007). 
102. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (holding that a district court was justified in sentencing 
outside the guidelines and finding that the controversial crack/powder disparity was at odds with 
§3553(a)). The Supreme Court further held that because the guidelines were no longer mandatory 
under Booker, there was no longer any reason to believe that the disparate ranges given for crack and 
powder cocaine offenses were likewise mandatory. Id.; see also Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586 (regarding 
standards of review). In Gall, the Supreme Court held that while the difference between a sentence 
and the guideline range was relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences (whether inside or 
outside of the Guidelines) under a “deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Id .
103. U. S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS
OF SENTENCING REFORM (2004) [hereinafter USSC Report, 2004] (analyzing a multitude of studies 
concerning the effectiveness of the Guidelines). The studies and their descriptions are found in 
chapter 3 of the report. Id. at 79-112.
104. Omitted variable bias means that the researcher has left out an important variable that 
may have caused changes in the dependent variable. Omitted variable bias results in researchers 
assuming that certain independent variables show clear causation when the real variable of causation 
has been omitted. 
  The only study that provided an analysis similar to the one employed here, which 
controls for case fact variation in order to avoid omitted variable bias, is one conducted by the USSC 
in 1991. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON 
THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN 
SENTENCING AND USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA 
BARGAINING, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1991) [hereinafter USSC Report, 1991] (summarizing the 
findings of a preliminary analysis of the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on sentences use a case 
fact matching procedure). The USSC’s 1991 analysis compared sentences for several crimes based 
on specific fact patterns prior to the Guidelines and after the Guidelines. The sample of Guideline 
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other words, most studies of the Guidelines to date do not adequately 
consider how the facts of the cases may drive the decisions that judges 
are making. This study substantially advances our understanding of the 
Guidelines by analyzing cases with similar case facts. In this way, 
matching of case facts allows for an analysis of the law’s impact free 
from analysis limitations where facts rather than law may be driving case 
outcomes. 
To examine the effect of the legal constraints on judicial discretion 
found in the Guidelines, case facts are matched and thus controlled for in 
order to specifically test the effect of the law on sentencing outcomes. 
The case pattern matching eliminates issues of unconfoundedness105 and 
the comparison of dissimilar cases. This is an improvement over other 
empirical studies that attempt to test the effect of the Guidelines by 
comparing all types of cases without controlling specifically for facts.106
Here, two drug trafficking crimes that differ only as to drug amounts are 
used for the analysis.107 The first crime [hereinafter “drug crime #1” or 
cases was very small. The USSC analyzed cases involving heroin and cocaine distribution that were 
similar to cases analyzed here except that the drug amounts were smaller. The results of the pre-
guideline analysis by the Sentencing Commission was as follows:





Minimum sentence 0.00 0.00
Maximum sentence 180.00 108.00
Mean 40.18 31.66
Standard Deviation 40.17 22.92
N 40 81
Id. at 295, 298. Although not a perfect pre-test, the above results are instructive for a general 
comparison of pre-guideline sentencing, showing that the standard deviation and thus variance of 
sentencing decisions was fairly significant prior to the Guidelines. 
105. Guido Imbens & Jeffrey Wooldridge, What’s New in Econometrics: Estimation of 
Average Treatment Effect under Unconfoundedness, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
SUMMER INSTITUTE (July 30, 2007) (video and slides available at www.nber.org). According to 
Imbens and Wooldridge, “Unconfoundedness. . . refers to the case where (non-parametrically) 
adjusting for differences in a fixed set of covariates removes biases in comparisons between treated 
and control units, thus allowing for a causal interpretation of those adjusted differences.” Id. at 1. By 
ensuring that observations or cases in a study are substantially similar, the effect of a treatment, such 
as a law or policy intervention, can be isolated.
106. See USSC Report, 2004, supra note 103 (summarizing quantitative studies on the impact 
of the Guidelines using a methodology that analyzes all case types together). 
107. U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1 (2005) (showing the difference in drug 
amounts for the two crimes analyzed here). 
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“amount #1”] involves smaller quantities of four drugs (cocaine, heroin, 
marijuana, and methamphetamine) than the second crime [hereinafter 
“drug crime #2” or “amount #2”]. The cases are matched by analyzing 
only those cases with substantially similar facts and relatively simple fact 
patterns. Specifically, these cases involve identical single convictions 
after guilty pleas of conspiracy to transport certain controlled substances 
under 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) and fall under the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Guideline Manual, §2D1.1. All of the cases involved one 
of four possible drugs; namely, cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and 
methamphetamine and carried a statutory minimum sentence of 10 
years.108 Despite the statutory minimum, the respective judge applied a 
safety valve provision allowing him or her to sentence defendants below 
this minimum under certain circumstances.109 In all of the cases, 
defendants had a criminal history level of I, meaning that defendants had 
no prior convictions or only one prior conviction with a sentence of less 
than 60 days.110 Additionally, the defendants in all of these cases 
accepted responsibility for their crimes such that the original base 
offense level was reduced by three points (i.e. setting guideline ranges at 
70 to 87 months in prison for drug amount #1 and 87 to 108 months for 
drug amount #2). Furthermore, there was no adjustment in the sentence 
due to the defendant’s role in the offense.
To test simply whether the mandated use of the sentencing table in 
the Guideline scheme affects case outcomes, the cases are further 
subdivided into either a control or treatment group. The control group 
included all cases in which judges chose not to depart from the 
sentencing table.111 The second group is a test or treatment group that 
included cases where judges used their discretion to depart from the table 
ranges. The observations consist of the average sentence for each drug 
Table N3. Drug amounts for two crimes analyzed. 
Drug 
amount
Heroin Cocaine Methamph-etamine Marijuana
1 700 G to < 1 KG 3.5 to < 5KG 350G to < 500G 700KG to < 1,000KG
2 1 to < 3 KG 5 to < 15KG 500G to <1.5 KG 1,000KG to < 3,000KG
These amounts have not changed between 1998 and 2006, the period studied. See 1998 to 2006, 
USSG §2D1.1, available at http://www.ussc.gov/guidelin.htm. 
108. 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (2006). 
109. 18 U.S.C. §3553(f) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §5C1.2, 410-12
(2008). 
110. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, §4A1.1 (2008). To receive a criminal history 
point, the prior offense carrying a sentence of less than 60 days must have occurred within ten years 
of the current offense if the defendant was 18 or over and within five years if the defendant was 
under eighteen years old. 
111. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A (2005). Guideline range is a 
range of sentences measured in months in prison that is determined from the intersection of offense 
level and criminal history on the sentencing table. 
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amount, the variance of case outcomes, and an analysis of left and right 
censorship of the guideline versus non-guideline cases. 
The two groups of cases analyzed are derived from federal 
sentencing cases, using databases created by the USSC and deposited 
with the Inter-University Consortium of Political and Social Research 
(“ICPSR”).112 Out of nearly half a million district court cases, I analyze a 
total of 1,752 drug distribution cases with the described fact patterns. Out 
of these cases, 1,112 cases had the fact pattern described as Group #1, 
and 640 cases involved facts described in Group #2. 
A.  Guideline Scheme Hypotheses, Predictions, and Results 
The two groups of cases, described above, allow for several 
hypotheses and predictions regarding the Guideline Scheme as follows: 
 Mandatory Guidelines Hypotheses:
      H1 = Mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines constrain district 
court judges. 
 Advisory Guidelines Hypotheses:
      H2 = Advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines constrain district 
court judges. 
The above two hypotheses essentially compare application of the 
Sentencing Guidelines when mandatory (prior to Booker) and when 
advisory (after Booker). These hypotheses lead to specific predictions 
which if true would confirm that judges act differently when their 
discretion is constrained by the Guideline sentencing table as compared 
to when they were allowed to depart. The predictions are as follows: 
1. Prediction 1
If the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ (mandatory or advisory) 
sentencing ranges are applied, judges will sentence the majority of all 
defendants not only within the Guideline range, but also to the very 
minimum of that range,113 whereas, when judges depart from  the 
Guidelines, judges will not sentence the majority of defendants to the 
112. See ICPSR, supra note 8, for the study numbers. 
113. Seventy months for drug amount #1 and eighty-seven months for drug amount #2. See
Guideline table reproduced at supra note 43 (drug amount #1 fits into offense level 27 and drug 
amount #2 fits into offense level 29). 
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minimum (0 months) of possible sentences. 
The logic behind this first prediction is that judges do not like to 
have their discretion constrained by Congress.114 To voice this discontent 
and perhaps to exhibit a generally more case-specific approach towards 
crime than that desired by elected politicians, judges applying the 
sentencing table ranges will consistently choose the minimum sentence 
allowed by the Sentencing Guideline ranges. I predict that the majority of 
judges who depart from the mandated range will not choose a sentence of 
zero or effectively acquit defendants because to do so would represent an 
approach to crime that is too soft or liberal for most judges. 
2. Prediction 2
The average sentence under the Guideline ranges will be longer than 
the average sentence for identical cases where the Guideline ranges are 
not applied. Deviations of the actual outcomes from the predicted 
outcomes will be negative and significant for non-Guideline range cases 
and positive and significant for Guideline cases. 
The logic behind this prediction is that when judges apply Guideline 
ranges, the sentences will be higher than when they depart from the 
ranges.115 This prediction is based on the belief that legislators desire to 
appear tough on crime in order to be re-elected, and they thus enact 
legislation that raises sentence length. Preferences of politicians for 
higher sentences should diverge from preferences of most federal judges 
who analyze the law and facts on a case-by-case basis. 
3.  Prediction 3
The standard deviation of cases sentenced within the Guideline 
ranges will be smaller than the standard deviation of cases sentenced 
outside these ranges. Moreover, the distribution of sentences for 
Guideline cases will be left (lower) censored at the minimum guideline 
range amount. 
114. During interviews held on May 7, May 9, 2007, and July 6, 2007, some Southern 
California district court judges said that they did not like Congress constraining their sentencing 
discretion as Congressmen do not have sentencing or criminal law expertise and re-election is their 
main motivation for enacting changes in sentencing law. 
115. This rather obvious prediction is based on the fact that judges rarely depart above the 
Guideline ranges. Instead, the majority of departures are below the Sentencing Guidelines. For 
example, in 2008, judges departed above the Guidelines 1.5% of the time, but departed downward 
due to substantial assistance 25.6% of the time and for other non-governmental reasons 13.4%. U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS Table N (2008), 
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/TableN.pdf. This outcome is consistent for all years when the 
Guidelines have been in force. These reports are provided by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission,http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm. 
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This final prediction is based on one of the underlining intentions of 
the Guideline system.116 Congress enacted the Guidelines in general to 
reduce disparities in sentences of identical or similar crimes.117
Therefore, the variance of sentences when Guideline table ranges are 
applied should be smaller than that of sentences when judges depart. 
Further, the prediction of the left censorship of cases in which judges do 
not depart is based on the general belief that judges would follow the 
Guidelines as Congress intended, but sentence on the low end. If the 
predictions are validated by the tests, this will show that Guidelines 
matter and effectively constrain judges and the Guideline minimums and 
maximums serve as effective barriers against unfettered judicial 
discretion. 
The quantitative results confirm the predictions delineated above and 
fail to reject Hypotheses 1 and 2. In other words, Guidelines matter and 
constrain judges. However, these constraints are imperfect because they 
still provide judges with discretion to depart from the Guidelines. First, 
when judges are constrained by the Guidelines, they sentence defendants 
to more time in prison than when not constrained by the Guidelines. For 
example, in comparing cases from 2004, sentences from the Guideline 
group were higher than the sentences from the departure group. The 
Guideline group had an average sentence of 71.32 months with a 
standard deviation of 3.78. The departure group had an average sentence 
of 54.80 months with a standard deviation of 11.69. In fact, on average, 
district court judges sentenced defendants to almost 1.4 to 2.8 years more 
time when their cases were sentenced inside the Guideline table ranges 
as compared to outside (See Table 1 below).  
Similarly, for cases in 2004 with drug amount #2, judges sentenced 
defendants on average to 88.33 months when the Guidelines were 
applied, as compared to an average of 61.40 months when Guidelines 
were not applied. Again, even with a higher Guideline range allowed due 
to greater quantities of drugs, judges still sentenced defendants to 
approximately 2 to 4 years more time in prison when the Guidelines were 
applied as compared to when they were not. This pattern, in fact, holds 
true for all of the cases from 1999 to the post-Booker cases, and no 
differences are seen in the period directly after either the PROTECT Act, 
Blakely, or Booker.118
116. The policy has been set out in each Guideline Manual. The policy portions are available 
in the introduction. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, 2-5 (2008).
117. Id. The policy statement includes three reasons for the enactment of the Guidelines. One 
of these was as follows, “Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the 
wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.” 
Id. at 2. 
118. Statistics from ICPSR were collapsed into a data base of drug trafficking cases described 
in this article. These smaller data sets are available upon request of the author at lbtiede@uh.edu. 
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 71.06 72.17 72.30 71.53 71.07 71.32 71.67 71.27
(3.29) (4.49) (4.90) (3.97) (3.50) (3.78) (4.24) (3.44)
No Guidelines
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
50.43 54.67 39.30 43.58 52.41 54.80 51.86 49.60
(11.24) (14.08) (14.85) (15.76) (13.15) (11.69) (13.56) (19.92)
Guidelines
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2 87.78 87.23 87.46 89.43 87.72 88.33 88.61 88.65
(1.97) (1.38) (1.84) (5.26) (2.41) (3.39) (4.15) (4.34)
No Guidelines
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
65.33 52.33 40.75 62.56 60.86 61.40 65.09 64.28
(11.93) (22.84) (11.76) (8.66) (17.61) (11.27) (18.48) (18.41)
Note: Sentences are average sentences in months in prison. 
Second, the prediction concerning the distribution of minimum 
sentences was also borne out by the tests. The sentencing guideline range 
for the crime studied with drug amount #1 was 70 to 87 months, allowing 
judges the discretion to choose sentences within a seventeen-month 
window. The guideline range for the same crime with drug amount #2 
was 87 to 108 months, allowing judges the discretion to choose sentences 
which could vary as much as 21 months. Despite this 17 to 21 month 
spread of sentencing choices, for cases applying the Guideline, district 
court judges overwhelmingly sentenced defendants to the minimum 
amount of time allowed under the table ranges regardless of what the 
Guideline stated minimum was. For the crimes analyzed for 2004, for 
drug amount #1, district court judges sentenced defendants to the 
minimum sentence of 70 months in prison 84 percent of the time. 
Similarly, in 2004, for drug amount #2, judges sentenced defendants to 
the minimum sentence of 87 months 83 percent of the time. As indicated 
in Table 3, this pattern was repeated for all of the years examined with 
the percentage of sentences at the minimum no less than 73 percent and 
sometimes as high as 95 percent. 
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% at 0 months 
(expected 0%)
1999 1 86 0
2 82 0
2000 1 74 0
2 95 0
2001 1 80 0
2 92 0
2002 1 76 0
2 73 0
2003 1 88 0
2 90 0
2004 1 84 0
2 83 0
2005 1 82 2
2 83 5
2006 1 82 0
2 81 0
Note: “% at” refers to the percent of cases in which sentences in each 
group were 0, 70 or 87 months in prison. 
A related prediction about whether judges sentence defendants to the 
minimum amount concerned, left censorship of guideline cases as 
compared to non-Guideline cases. The Guideline cases were left 
censored at the minimum of the Guideline table range. (See Figures 1 
and 2 below). Conversely, for non-Guideline cases—judges, as we would 
expect—did not sentence the majority of the defendants to the minimum 
possible sentence of zero months in prison. For cases based on departures 
authorized by the Guidelines, there were no sentences of zero months in 
prison for 1999 to 2004. In 2005, district court judges sentenced 
defendants in this category to zero months in prison 2 to 5 percent of the 
time. 
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Figure 2. Drug amount #2: guideline range cases only (1999-2006) 
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Third, the predictions regarding the standard deviation119 and 
distribution of cases were also confirmed. The standard deviation of total 
sentences for Guideline table range cases was considerably smaller than 
the standard deviation for non-Guideline cases in all of the tests. 
Conversely, sentences had a greater standard deviation and thus varied 
more widely when judges were not constrained by the Guidelines. As 
seen in Table 2, for 2004, the standard deviation, for cases sentenced 
under the Guidelines for drug amount #1 and #2, was about three times 
smaller than those not sentenced under the Guidelines. In fact, in all 
instances examined the standard deviation for cases sentenced under the 
Guidelines was considerably smaller than that for cases sentenced 
outside of the Guidelines. This result persisted even after Booker. 
Cases where advisory guidelines were applied had considerably less 
variance than cases with observed departures. This conclusion was 
supported by district court judges interviewed in 2007, who claimed that 
after Booker, they still follow the Guidelines most of the time and in the 
same manner as prior to Booker.120
B.  Changes in the Law Hypotheses and Results 
Besides testing the effect of the overall Guideline scheme, I also test 
whether reforms to that scheme affected case outcomes. The effects of 
reforms to the Sentencing Guidelines on case outcomes are tested using 
an interrupted time series analyses. The hypotheses for the reforms in 
law are as follows:121
 H3 = Legal reforms which decrease judicial discretion will: 
a) Increase sentence length 
b) Decrease disparity 
c) Decrease the number of departures 
119. Variance of sentences is a measure of how widely individual district court judges’ 
sentences vary from each other. It is measured by the standard deviation or square root of the 
variance defined as the spread of possible sentences around the average of all sentences. 
120. District court judge interviews, supra note 35. 
121. Hypothesis testing allows social scientists to determine the causal relationship between 
variables of interest. Basic regression analysis allows social scientists to determine the degree that 
one variable (i.e. a dependent variable) is explained by another variable (i.e. the independent 
variable). For this part of the analysis, the dependent variables are such things as a) sentence length, 
b) disparity, and c) number of departures. The main causal or independent variables are the decision 
to depart as well as legal reforms that increase judicial discretion (i.e. U.S. v. Booker) or decrease it 
(i.e. the PROTECT Act). A regression equation attempts to capture the causal relationship by 
holding other factors constant to isolate the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable. In regression equations, the dependant variable is placed on the left hand side of the 
equation and the independent variables or causal variables are placed on the right hand side of the 
equation. 
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 H4 = Legal reforms which increase judicial discretion will: 
a) Decrease sentence length 
b) Increase disparity 
c) Increase the number of departures 
These hypotheses are based on the theory that the amount of 
discretion afforded judges is directly related to disparity and number of 
departures and inversely related to sentence length. In other words, when 
judges have their discretion taken away by Congress in the form of the 
Guidelines or subsequent legislation, such as the PROTECT Act, 
sentence length will increase while sentencing disparity and number of 
departures will decrease. Likewise, when district court judges are 
afforded more discretion as they were after Blakely and Booker, sentence 
length will decrease while disparity in sentences of similar cases and 
departures will increase.
The basic regression model for these hypotheses using sentence 
length as a dependent variable is as follows: 
SENTENCE LENGTH = β0 + β1PROTECT + β2Blakely + β3Booker
+ β4Depart + β5(vector of year dummies) + β6(vector of circuit 
dummies) + ε 122
Where, 
SENTENCE LENGTH= the sentence defendants received in months 
in prison less the guideline minimum. 
PROTECT = The PROTECT Act (0 if district court case occurred 
before the Act, 1 if after Act). 
Blakely = The decision in Blakely v. Washington (0 if district court 
case occurred before court decision, 1 if after). 
Booker = The decision of U.S. v. Booker (0 if district court case 
occurred before court decision, 1 if after). 
122. This regression equation is used to determine the effect of each independent variable on 
sentence length when all other independent variables are held constant. Social scientists strive to 
include all causal variables in their regression equation. Thus, while the particular year in which a 
case was decided may not per se be of interest, it is included in the equation as it may contribute to 
variations in the outcome or dependent variable. By including independent variables, such as a 
vector of circuit and year dummies, the social scientist controls for factors that may be leading to 
changes in the dependent variable—here sentence length—in order to isolate the effect of the legal 
change. 
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Depart = Departure type (0 if no departures and Guideline sentencing 
ranges followed, 1 if departures and sentencing ranges not followed. 
Vector of year dummies = representation of the year in which each 
case was decided. 
Vector of circuit dummies = A representation of the particular circuit 
in which each case was decided (1 though 12 correspond to each circuit. 
The 9th Circuit is left out of the regression).123
In one regression, I use data which includes cases prior to the 
PROTECT Act and before Blakely/Booker to isolate the effect of the 
PROTECT Act on sentences. In a second regression, I use all of the data 
to analyze the three legal reforms together. Hypotheses relating to 
departure rates and disparity are tested by comparing standard deviations 
and number of departures graphically during specific time periods. 
Further, I compare whether the location of a case within a specific 
judicial circuit affects disparity and departure rates. 
The direct impact of the PROTECT Act and the Supreme Court 
decisions in Blakely and Booker was examined through Hypotheses 3 
and 4 above. In the first regression, the effect of the PROTECT Act on 
sentence length was isolated by limiting the data to cases prior to the 
PROTECT Act and prior to Blakely. The regression results are as 
follows: 
1. For Drug Amount #1
SENTENCE LENGTH = 1.68  +  -1.38 PROTECT + -13.39Departure  + 
                           (1.64)      (1.02)                       (0.45)
β3(years) + β4(circuits) + ε
N = 571. Adj. R2 = 0.63 
Significant coefficients in italics; standard errors in parentheses. 
123. Dummy variables, such as circuit and year, simply indicate where a case is placed 
temporally and spatially (i.e. the case occurred in the Ninth Circuit or not). To use such dummy 
variables correctly, a base group must be designated for comparison. The interpretation of 
coefficients for each different group of cases (i.e. cases occurring in the Second Circuit) is made in 
relationship to the base group (here the Ninth Circuit). For example, if the coefficient for the second
circuit is 1.9, this means that a case occurring in the second circuit will have a sentence of 1.9 
months longer than that occurring in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit was chosen as a base group 
as this was the largest circuit. 
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2. For Drug Amount #2
SENTENCE LENGTH =  2.47  +  -1.44PROTECT + -15.84Departure  +  
                                   (2.38)     (1.55)                       (0.58) 
β3(years) + β4(circuits) + ε
N = 315. Adj. R2 =  0.74. 
These results (presented in full in Table A1 of the Appendix) show 
that the PROTECT Act had no statistically significant effect on sentence 
length. Instead, the only statistically significant determinant of sentence 
length was the judges’ decision to depart or not, which is embedded in 
the original Guideline scheme discussed at the beginning of this paper. 
In the second set of regressions, the effect of all three legal changes 
is tested using all of the data, but as in the first regression set, the 
decision to depart significantly lowers the sentence length. The full 
results for the second set of regressions are presented in Table A2 of the 
Appendix. For sentence length, the changes in the law had no effect for 
either drug type. The results are as follows: 
1. For Drug Amount #1
SENTENCE LENGTH =  0.59  +  -1.00PROTECT +  0.56Blakely +  
                                 (1.99)     (1.31)                   (1.00)       
 1.36Booker + -11.27Departure  + β5(years) + β6(circuits) + ε
(2.07)              (0.33) 
N = 1,112  . Adj. R2 = 0.54 . 
Significant coefficients in italics; standard errors in parentheses. 
2. For Drug Amount #2
SENTENCE LENGTH = 1.73 +  -1.25PROTECT +  -0.37Blakely +
                                (3.24)    (2.18)                    (1.41)   
 2.21Booker + -13.61Departure  + β5(years)  + β6(circuits) + ε
(3.66)               (0.48) 
N = 640. Adj. R2 = 0.59 
As shown by the two regressions above, whether judges depart from 
the Guidelines has the largest impact on sentence length. None of the 
legal changes had any statistically significant effect on sentence length. 
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While the above results show that the three legal reforms had little or 
no effect on sentence length for sentences that either followed the 
Guideline structure or a departure scheme, the question remains: What 
effect did the legal changes have on disparity and the number of 
departures? To determine the effect of the legal changes on disparity, the 
standard deviation of case decisions around the average sentence for each 
drug type before and after legal reform was analyzed. For this part of the 
analysis, which relies on several graphic depictions, the periods of time 
analyzed are 1) prior to the PROTECT Act, 2) between the PROTECT 
Act and the decision in Blakely, and 3) after the Blakely decision. For 
graphical analysis, the date of Blakely in 2004 is used to define groups 
because Blakely marked the first instance when the Supreme Court 
signaled that district court judges might be afforded more discretion. 
Prior to any legal amendments to the Guidelines, the standard 
deviation for all cases (Guideline table and departures) was 9.68 for drug 
amount #1 and 12.24 for drug amount #2. After Congress reduced the 
ability of judges to depart in the PROTECT Act, the average standard 
deviation was reduced to 6.73 for drug amount #1 and 8.72 for drug 
amount #2. Finally, after Blakely, which signaled a new era of 
sentencing, and allowed judges to have greater discretion, the standard 
deviation increased to 11.41 for drug amount #1 and 13.82 for drug 
amount #2. The disparity of decisions after Blakely exceeded both the 
pre-PROTECT Act and post-PROTECT Act period. These results 
indicate that the legal amendments, while having little effect on average 
national sentence length of Guideline range or departure cases, did affect 
disparity of decisions across judicial circuits. 
Figure 3. Disparity of sentencing decisions. 
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 To determine the effect of the legal reforms on departure rates 
(Changes in Guideline Scheme, Hypothesis 5), rates of departure for 
three periods were explored to isolate the effect of each legal change on 
departure rates. As seen in Figure 4, prior to the PROTECT Act, for drug 
amount #1 judges departed from the guidelines about 9.56% and for drug 
amount #2 12.97% of the time. As intended by the PROTECT Act, 
departure rates following this Act were dramatically reduced to 3.26% 
for drug amount #1 and 4.62% for drug amount #2. After 
Blakely/Booker, departure rates for both drugs increased dramatically, 
exceeding those from the pre-PROTECT period. For example, departures 
increased to18.85% for drug amount #1 and 20.31% for drug amount #2 
after the Blakely decision. The additional discretion afforded by 
Blakely/Booker caused judges to depart substantially more. 
Figure 4. Departure rates.
 The above results show the effect of changes in laws on sentencing 
disparity and departure for the entire nation. As previously mentioned, 
these overall results mask variation among the districts and circuits. As 
seen in Figure 5, sentence length varies among the circuits for each time 
period analyzed when data for both drug crimes is pooled together to 
allow for a meaningful circuit level comparison.124 In the period prior to 
the PROTECT Act, average sentences varied widely among the circuits. 
District courts in the Ninth Circuit on average sentenced defendants to 
124. It should be noted that some circuits have more cases than others. It is possible that the 
proportion of one type of drug case relative to another type of cases could affect the results.  
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less time for the crimes analyzed, while the Third Circuit had the highest 
average sentences for this period. 
Figure 5. Sentence length by circuit after major changes in the law.
In the second time period, it was expected that sentence length would 
increase because judges were supposed to depart less after the 
PROTECT Act, which in turn would increase average sentence length. 
Congress enacted the PROTECT Act to target judicial districts where it 
was believed that judges were departing too much and had average 
sentencing lengths that were too low. In other words, Congress seemed 
to be specifically targeting most Southwest states as well as a few other 
districts that had high departure rates prior to the PROTECT Act as 
compared to the rest of the nation.125 While the majority of circuits were 
responsive to the legislators’ intent, judges in the First through Fourth 
Circuits defied this trend by sentencing defendants to less time. The 
Ninth Circuit did, however, comply as intended and substantially 
increased sentence length during this period. Finally, after 
Blakely/Booker it was expected that sentence length would substantially 
decrease because judges would have more discretion to depart, and it was 
assumed that they would use this discretion. While sentence length did 
decrease in eight of eleven judicial circuits, it remained about the same in 
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and increased only slightly in the Second 
Circuit. Further, post-Booker, sentence length was lower than the pre-
PROTECT Act period in only six circuits, suggesting that Booker did not 
trump the effect of the PROTECT Act in all circuits. 
Disparity and departure rates within circuits also varied considerably 
depending on the circuit. Prior to the PROTECT Act the disparity of 
125. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, at 34-35.
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average sentences varied significantly by circuit with the Ninth Circuit 
having the highest rate of disparity (See Figure 6 below). The PROTECT 
Act was supposed to limit the ability of judges to depart, and in theory 
limit the disparity of decisions. Disparity decreased in five circuits 
appreciably after the PROTECT Act. In two of the circuits (First and 
Third), there was no appreciable difference in disparity for this time 
period. After Blakely/Booker, judges’ expanded discretion was thought to 
lead to an increase in disparity as noted in the dissent by Justice Breyer 
in Booker.126 However, as with the analysis of other time periods, not all 
the circuits acted the same. Disparity actually decreased in the First, 
Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. 
Figure 6. Disparity by circuit after major changes in the law. 
Finally, departure rates did not increase as dramatically as expected 
after Booker. The circuit-level departure rate analysis is similar to the 
sentence length and disparity analyses. In short, district courts located in 
particular circuits varied widely in the amount they departed during 
certain time periods. Some circuits acted as expected, departing less after 
the PROTECT Act and more after Booker, while other circuits acted 
quite differently. 
VI.  DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS
What do the results tell us about the regulation of judicial discretion? 
As seen by the sentencing data, the Guideline scheme—in which the 
USSC and Congress specify the amount of judicial discretion to be 
exercised in specific cases—matters and has a profound effect on case 
126. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 329 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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outcomes even where the effects are not necessarily those intended by 
the legislature. First, cases implicating the Guideline’s table ranges result 
in higher sentences. If elected politicians want to limit judicial discretion 
in sentencing and appear tough on crime, this goal can be accomplished 
by highly specific legislation in which they limit judges’ discretion. As 
shown by the results, higher sentences are achieved if judges are 
compelled to use the sentencing tables. When case facts and the law 
allow for departures, sentences are lower and may subvert the intent of 
Congress. 
Second, the variance of sentences is highly dependent on whether 
judges apply Guideline ranges or not. When judges depart, the variance 
of possible outcomes increased three to six times. This suggests that 
where judges’ discretion is not constrained and they choose to apply 
departures there is greater disparity in case outcomes for similar cases. 
Analysis of the variance of case outcomes by group makes it clear that 
Congress’ goal of reducing disparity in sentences nationally was 
achieved, but only when judges used the sentencing table, not when they 
departed from it. 
Third, when judges applied Guideline ranges from the sentencing 
table, they sentenced the overwhelming majority of these defendants to 
the absolute minimum sentence of the sentencing range. Although 
sentencing tables allowed judges to choose one sentence out of seventeen 
to twenty-one choices, judges nationwide chose the lowest sentence in 
the range 73% to 95% of the time. While the sentencing guideline 
boundaries constrain judges’ discretion, the lower limit provides a focal 
point for judges’ decisions in the majority of cases. This implies that 
judges are constrained only by the minimum sentence and not the range 
of possible sentences. 
Fourth, the dramatic changes in Guideline laws do not seem to affect 
sentence length significantly for either the Guideline group or departure 
group nationwide, but did affect departure rates and disparity. Despite 
what were thought to be the two most dramatic changes in the Federal 
Sentencing Guideline system since its inception, the PROTECT Act and 
Booker, these changes seem to have had little effect on sentences within
each of the two groups. As a result, sentence length is driven most 
significantly by district court judges’ choice to depart and drug amount. 
Congress’s attempt to limit departures and the Supreme Court’s decision 
to render the Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory did not alter 
sentence length within the Guideline and departure categories, at least 
not immediately. This suggests that the Guideline application is path 
dependent. Judges who had been trained in Federal Guidelines when they 
were mandatory continued to apply them in the same way, even after 
they were transformed into advisory constraints judges. Finally, legal 
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regulation of discretion directly affected departure rates. When discretion 
is constrained (after the PROTECT Act) departure rates go down, and 
when discretion is augmented (after Blakely and Booker) departure rates 
increase—at least when national averages are analyzed. Legal regulation 
also affected the disparity of sentencing decisions for similar defendants 
convicted of similar crimes. When discretion is constrained the disparity 
of outcomes decreases; when discretion is augmented case outcomes are 
more disparate nationwide. 
The circuit-level analysis revealed wide variation in decision making 
across circuits in all three time-periods. Although one of the main 
reasons for enacting the Sentencing Guidelines was to reduce the 
disparity of outcomes based on location, sentence length, departure rates, 
and disparity varied by circuit. This variation continued when I 
specifically analyze the period after the PROTECT Act and after Booker.
As far as the PROTECT Act, seven out of eleven circuits acted in the 
way that the legislature intended—i.e. raised sentences, lowered 
departure rates, and lowered disparity of outcomes. However, district 
courts in the First through Fourth Circuits were not so responsive. Rather 
than increase sentence length in these circuits, sentence length actually 
decreased from pre-PROTECT Act sentences. However, if legislators 
only intended to target certain district courts such as those located in the 
Ninth Circuit, as suggested by some of the legislative history,127 then 
they were highly successful. In the Ninth Circuit the average sentence for 
both crimes increased from 67.07 months in prison to 79.65 months in 
prison after the PROTECT Act. 
Likewise, Booker had mixed effects depending on court location. In 
every circuit but three (the Second, Fifth, and Sixth), sentence length 
decreased from the post-PROTECT era cases to the post-Booker era 
cases. However in four circuits the decrease did not render sentences 
lower than the pre-PROTECT period. As a result, Booker did not have 
the feared effect of reducing sentences substantially. The circuit-level 
analysis of disparity and departure rates shows again that there was great 
variation in district court responses to the changes in law. Altering 
discretion of lower court judges did not always have the intended effect; 
only in some of the circuits was an increase in discretion met with lower 
sentences and greater disparity and decrease in discretion met with 
higher sentences and less disparity. 
127. USSC 2003, supra note 4, at 34-35.
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VII.  A CASE FOR ALLOWING SENTENCING DISPARITY TO PERSIST
The results of this study have shown that the Sentencing Guidelines 
effectively constrain judges when those judges apply the sentencing table 
ranges. In other words, when the legislator limits the sentencing choices 
of judges through the use of the sentencing table, judges heed these 
limitations. However, the Guideline system provides an imperfect way of 
constraining judicial discretion because the system itself allows judges to 
depart from the sentencing table ranges in certain instances and these 
departures lead to much of the disparity in sentencing. 
Although the USSC and many politicians argue that disparity 
resulting from judges’ discretionary departure is unwanted and creates 
unfairness, there are indeed arguments for allowing district court judges 
to use their discretion. Information supporting the arguments in favor of 
discretion and disparity comes from the quantitative analysis presented 
here as well as from interviews and a nationwide survey which I 
conducted in 2007 and 2008. 128
128. In order to understand more effectively what judges think about constraints imposed on 
their sentencing discretion, I conducted a nationwide survey of district court judges replicating that 
done by the USSC in 1991. U. S. Sentencing Comm’n, NATIONAL SURVEY OF JUDGES AND COURT 
PRACTITIONERS (1991) (ICPSR SURVEY NO. 9837) (Codebook and data deposited with ICPSR in 
Ann Arbor, Michigan). I then compared responses in 1991 to 2007/2008. The survey also was 
supplemented with responses to questions I posed directly to judges in the Eastern, Central and 
Southern judicial districts of California during live interviews. In the USSC’s 1991 survey, 415 
active district court judges provided opinions about the Guidelines and their application. Id. In the 
2008 survey that I conducted, 125 judges responded including fourteen from districts in California 
who agreed to live interviews to complete the survey. The 2008 responses were added to the USSC’s
1991 database to create a data file containing 540 observations for two time periods. 
  The 2008 survey included twenty-seven questions from the USSC’s 1991 survey on 
topics regarding sentencing disparity, plea bargains, guideline departures, and Congressional 
restrictions on discretion such as mandatory minimums, consecutive sentences, and the Guidelines 
themselves. The majority of questions provided multiple-choice responses with either a range of 
choices or simply a yes or no response. All of the questions allowed judges to respond with “don’t
know.” For the questions on disparity, respondents had six choices regarding the prevalence of a 
stated event which ranged from “in all or most cases” to “in no cases.” Many of the multiple choice 
questions were followed with open ended questions which in the 1991 survey were coded to fit into 
categories defined by the USSC. The 1991 responses to open ended questions were unavailable. The 
open ended responses to the 2008 survey have been recorded but were not coded using the USSC 
rules as this would involve a subjective determination. 
  In the 2008 survey, I excluded some case specific questions asked to judges in 1991, but 
included additional questions on the political party appointing the judge, year of appointment, 
location of judges, advantages and disadvantages of the Guideline system, and finally opinions 
concerning the effect of the PROTECT Act and U.S. v. Booker. The surveys were confidential and 
the majority of judges did not provide their names. After mailing surveys to over 600 district court 
judges between October 2007 and February 2008, in March 2008, I sent a one page letter to judges 
asking them to respond to the previously mailed survey if they had not already done so. My efforts 
resulted in 125 completed surveys. In some instances, judges did not answer all of the survey 
questions. In a few instances, there was missing data on one or more of the variables for district 
location, year of appointment, or party of appointing president. 
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First, disparity should be seen as positive when it allows judges to 
exercise their discretion to fashion just sentences. District court judges 
are more qualified and have more experience than Congress and higher 
court judges when it comes to sentencing individual defendants because 
they oversee thousands of Sentencing Guideline plea bargains and 
hundreds of trials during their careers on the bench. These are two tasks 
that neither Congress nor appellate courts ever undertake. 129
Second, although judges do not like their discretion constrained, it 
does not follow that they will abuse their discretion when such 
constraints are removed. District court judges surveyed nationwide, and 
interviewed in person in California, indicated that they do not like 
discretion limiting legislation such as the PROTECT Act and preferred 
discretion expanding policies by the Supreme Court in Booker. Indeed, 
eighty-two percent of judges surveyed and interviewed indicated that 
they preferred sentencing after Booker as compared to during the pre-
Booker period.130 Although it can generally, and not surprisingly, be said 
that judges who have experienced the Guidelines for some time do not 
like their discretion constrained,131 it does not follow that judges would 
fail to apply the law as written. Rather, judges apply Guideline ranges 
and continue to do so even though the Guidelines are no longer 
mandatory constraints in the majority of their cases.132
The third justification for allowing disparity in sentencing is that 
there are many variations in local case loads and practices which suggest 
that cases in one area of the country should not be treated the same as 
cases in the other part of the country. For example, disparity is often due 
129. One active district court judge explained that during confirmation hearings, many 
Congressmen are very supportive of the appointees, but after the confirmation process they claim 
these same judges are “renegades” Interview 7303, November 29, 2007. Several judges also voiced 
the concern of one district court judge that Congressmen were “grossly ignorant” of the sentencing 
laws and did not have a “rational basis” for reforms, but simply enact them to appease the voting 
public (Interview 7401, May 7, 2007; Interview 7402, May 9, 2007; Interview 7303, November 29, 
2007). Despite the negative reaction to Congress, judges are compelled to follow the law and do 
indeed follow it in the vast majority of cases they hear. 
130. LYDIA BRASHEAR TIEDE, THE POLITICS OF CRIMINAL LAW REFORM: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF LOWER COURT DECISION-MAKING (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
California, San Diego) (on file with the Department of Political Science). 
131. Prior to Booker, judges referred to themselves as “not judges,” but as orangutans or 
automatons. Interview with a senior district judge, June 13, 2007; Survey response 101. One district 
court judge from the First Circuit stated that he “emphatically” preferred sentencing after Booker
because “Booker restored [him] to the role of judge rather than an automaton mouthing the sentence 
the executive pre-determined” District court survey response 101.
132. While judges indicated that Booker had a dramatic effect on their sentencing decisions, 
judges still indicated that in the majority of cases, sometimes up to 99%, they still apply the 
Guidelines. This was confirmed by both interviews and survey responses conducted in 2007/2008. 
Judges did, however, indicate that besides giving them more discretion, Booker makes sentencing 
defendants take considerably more time as judges now list all the factors they consider for 
sentencing and often make a written record of all the factors that contributed to the sentence, as 
shown me by one district judge in Santa Ana California (Interview 7307, October 11, 2007). 
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to pre-sentencing differences in prosecutors’ charging and pleading 
practices;133 the availability of certain types of defense attorneys;134
caseloads;135 and local case-processing practices.136 Still others believe 
disparity is primarily due to gender, race, and ethnicity.137 Finally, 
disparity often corresponds to the specific regions where district court 
judges are located.138 Because pre-sentencing procedures are so diverse 
and pervasive, judges should be able to alter their sentencing practices to 
respond in kind. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION
In this Article, the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines that limit 
district court judges’ discretion on outcomes of cases has been tested 
using a unique method to control for variations in case facts. Whether 
judges apply sentencing table ranges or depart from them dramatically 
affects sentencing outcomes and disparity of sentencing results. Legal 
changes of the Guideline scheme had little effect on sentence length 
within groups when departures were controlled for. In other words, cases 
where sentences are based on the Guideline ranges have varied little 
despite the legal changes to the Guideline scheme. Likewise, cases which 
did not employ Guideline ranges also varied little. However, sentence 
length was affected by legal changes when cases were analyzed at the 
circuit level. The results also suggest that Congress may have enacted 
laws changing the Guideline system to rein in some recalcitrant agents, 
such as the district courts in the Ninth Circuit, without giving much 
thought to their effect on other districts. 
The legal changes also affected rates of departure nationwide and by 
circuits. When judges’ discretion was limited, as after the PROTECT 
Act, judges’ rates of departure as a whole decreased. When judges’ 
discretion was expanded after Booker, departure rates increased. Further, 
133. USSC Report, G (2004) supra, note 103; Stephano Bibas, Federalism: Regulating Local 
Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 137, 142–44 (2005). 
134. Douglas Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Exploring the Risk of Disparity 
from Differences in Defense Counsel under Guideline Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. REV. 435 (2002). 
135. William Braniff, Local Discretion, Prosecutorial Choices, and the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 309 (1993). 
136. J. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Four U.S. District 
Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 255 (2005). 
137. M. Free, The Impact of Federal Sentencing Reforms on African Americans, 28 J. BLACK 
STUDIES 268 (1997); David Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: 
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285 (2001); L. Pasko, Villain or Victim: 
Regional Variation and Ethnic Disparity in Federal Drug Offense Sentencing, 13 CRIM. J. POL. 
REV. 307 (2002). 
138. U. S. Sentencing Comm’n (2008), supra note 115 (showing the sentences for criminal 
categories by circuit and state). By analyzing these tables as well as those for other years, it is clear 
that the sentence length and departure rates for particular crimes vary by region. 
1] SENTENCING GUIDELINES & JUDICIAL DISCRETION 43
the legal changes affected the rates of disparity in sentencing as 
measured by the standard deviation. When judges are given more 
discretion, similarly situated criminal defendants are treated more 
disparately. However, this result also depends on where the district 
courts are located. When both drug types are pooled, district courts 
located in various circuits vary in how they react and comply with 
Supreme Court decisions and legislation. Such results indicate that the 
lower courts’ responsiveness to higher court precedent and legislation 
varies by court location and, while the intent of the legislature may be 
achieved for some circuits, other district courts fail to comply with the 
legislative intent. The lack of a pattern in compliance and non-
compliance suggests the need for new theories regarding lower court 
decision making via other political actors. 
This analysis shows that written laws that constrain judicial 
discretion can work and that judges follow the constraints delineated in 
the four corners of the statute. However, where there is room for judges 
to exercise their own discretion they will do so, allowing departures in 
cases where they believe they are warranted. Finally, this study has 
shown that if Congress really wants to constrain judges, it can by 
specifically stating so in the law. The real question is, after Booker, does 
Congress want to revert back to a system of limiting discretion?
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Appendix 
Table A1 Multiple Regression Analysis of Sentence on PROTECT Act
Independent SENTENCE LENGTH
Variables Drug Amount #1 Drug Amount #2




Year 1999 1.85 -2.66
(1.64) (2.38)
Year 2000 2.25 -4.00
(1.65) (2.35)
Year 2001 1.67 -4.03
(1.67) (2.42)
Year 2002 0.59 -0.46
(1.61) (2.32)
Year 2003 1.39 -1.16
(1.74) (2.59)
Year 2004 2.55 -0.02
(1.92) (2.77)
Year 2005 - -

























Adjusted R2 0.63 0.74
Note: Coefficients are un-standardized ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression values; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients in 
italics are significant at p<.10, *p< 0.05 and  ** p<0.00. 
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Table A2 Multiple Regression Analysis of Sentence on all  legal changes
Independent SENTENCE LENGTH
Variables Drug Amount #1 Drug Amount #2








Year 1999 1.82 -1.69
(2.08) (3.38)
Year 2000 2.24 -3.60
(2.09) (3.33)
Year 2001 1.32 -3.46
(2.11) (3.44)
Year 2002 0.45 0.03
(2.05) (3.30)
Year 2003 1.47 -0.51
(2.21) (3.66)
Year 2004 2.38 0.73
(2.45) (3.92)
Year 2005 0.92 -0.01
(3.24) (5.40)
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(0.85) (1.18)







Adjusted R2 0.54 0.59
Note: Coefficients are un-standardized ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression values; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients in 
italics are significant at p<0.01 
